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Returnee TravailsAccording to information compiled by Marat Baratashvili, a representative of the Hsna organization, the first Meskhetians managed to return to Georgia informally in 1969. (In deference to the Georgian government preference, the term Meskhetian will be used in this chapter.) Though such action was technically illegal, small numbers of Meskhetians continued to quietly return throughout the last two decades of the Soviet Union’s existence. Their activities avoided scrutiny in large part because virtually all returnees settled in remote agricultural communities.
The first opportunity for large-scale, organized Meskhetian repatriation came in the late 1980s, with the advent of former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev’s liberalization policies, collectively known as perestroika. Georgian communist leaders, acting under pressure from the Kremlin, adopted measures to facilitate the return of formerly deported peoples. However, widespread turmoil, resulting from the failed effort to resuscitate the moribund Soviet political and economic system, prevented these early repatriation efforts from producing tangible results.
In the final analysis, perestroika proved to be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it was responsible for creating repatriation possibilities. On the other hand, it was a major factor in unleashing pent-up nationalist fury in Georgia that ended up working against the repatriation of formerly deported peoples. The initial efforts of Georgian nationalists to realize their ambitions were met by Soviet authorities with ruthless opposition, culminating in a confrontation in April 1989 in which troops attacked a crowd of demonstrators leaving scores dead. Ultimately, however, the nationalists prevailed, wrecking the would-be repatriation framework in the process.
Following the Soviet collapse, nationalist forces, led by Zviad Gamsakhurdia, came to power in Georgia. Tumult ensued, as the Gamsakhurdia regime plunged the country into a protracted period of interethnic conflict and civil strife. Amidst the Abkhazian separatist struggle, Gamsakhurdia promoted policies that, instead of promoting repatriation, actually led to the expulsion of many Meskhetians who had already settled in Georgia. Anti-Meskhetian hysteria eased after a brief civil war, and, after Eduard Shevardnadze replaced Gamsakhurdia, new initiatives were undertaken by the government to promote return. But the effort came with the caveat that the return option was available only to those Meskhetians who expressed a willingness to adopt a Georgian cultural identity.
An estimated 500 Meskhetians accepted this condition and have resettled in Georgia since 1992. That total included roughly several hundred state-sponsored university students. A significant number of these returnees are housed in a dilapidated complex in the isolated Gldani neighborhood on the outskirts of Tbilisi. The rest are found in agricultural areas around the country. Only a few actually live in the Meskhetia region.
Government efforts to assist returnees have encountered mixed results. Many of those who have returned were discontent, saying the state has balked in following up on commitments to ease hardships associated with repatriation. “They promised us a lot, but they have not delivered much,” said Mursal Mamedov, a 26-year-old university student.
Financial woes were a major factor in the burgeoning dissatisfaction of Meskhetians. Integration programs, including Georgian language instruction, have suffered from a lack of resources. Most Meskhetian returnees, especially those born after 1944, arrived in Georgia unable to speak the local language. Not all have easy access to language instruction. And even for those with access, the quality of instruction suffered.
Those housed at the Gldani complex were offered three hours of language instruction per week. But effectiveness was limited by deficiencies in the facilities and equipment available to instructors. For example, Khatiya Katelia, one of three language instructors at the Gldani complex, said a textbook specifically designed to help Meskhetians learn Georgian had been developed, yet a lack of money had prevented publication. Language instruction was supposed to come under the auspices of a repatriation adaptation center envisioned in a presidential decree in 1996. But those plans, as will be detailed below, have not been realized.
Meskhetian disaffection could not be entirely linked to the government’s financial difficulties. Returnees said that administrative barriers had the effect, whether intended or not, of discouraging integration efforts. They complained they were denied citizenship and other vital rights, even though they had complied with government-imposed prerequisites, including the adoption of Georgianized identities.
The experience of Mamuka Khotishvili reflected the difficulties encountered by many returnees. Khotishvili came to Georgia in April 1997 from the Russian autonomous province of Kabardino-Balkaria. He had pooled money with his brothers in order to purchase property, become established, and then send for the rest of the family, who had remained in Russia. Initially, the plan went according to schedule. He settled in Akhaltsikhe, the regional capital of Meskhetia and, with the help of Georgian authorities, he eventually found a house to purchase.
That is when his troubles began.
First, his Georgian neighbors were not hospitably disposed to the arrival of Meskhetians. “The neighbors were fairly hostile in the beginning. During the first few days I felt like an animal trapped in a cage,” Khotishvili said. “After a while, when I had had an opportunity to talk to them, they eventually came to realize that we Meskhetians are not beasts.”
But winning over his neighbors was easy in comparison to gaining the understanding of local bureaucrats, Khotishvili reported. Although he said he paid for his house in cash, he has not been able to formerly register the sale and thus acquire title to the property. “When I went to get the document, the notary refused to approve the transaction, and he provided no reason for his action,” Khotishvili said. “A situation exists in which some bureaucrats are categorically opposed to the return of Meskhetians.… Some in positions of power abuse their authority and threaten to fire any functionary who approves documents submitted by us.” He added that he has submitted naturalization papers, but so far he has not received citizenship.
Lack of documentation was also a concern of some Meskhetian students. Mamedov and others at the Gldani complex said they did not possess valid residency permits, even though they were invited to study in Georgia by the government and had already spent several years in the country. They added that a serious problem loomed with the approach of graduation because a valid residency permit was needed to receive a diploma. Residency permits were also needed in order to work legally in Georgia. “It is a crazy situation,” Mamedov said. “We should automatically be citizens, but they [the authorities] do not do anything. We even have young Meskhetian men who have served in the Georgian army and who do not receive citizenship.”
Another obstacle to integration was corruption. International observers noted that the nearly insatiable appetite for bribes among officials was especially burdensome for returning Meskhetians. “For anyone returning it is a huge problem,” said Heidi Olufsen, a Tbilisi-based human rights officer for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. “Newcomers do not possess the network of contacts that are needed to get things done. They have no alternative but to pay bribes.”
In addition, some at the Gldani center complained about cramped living conditions, in which up to five persons were forced to live in rooms designed for two. While such complaints are understandable, it cannot be said that the Meskhetians were victims of housing discrimination. Given the large number of displaced people, the housing shortage affected not only Meskhetians, but everyone in Georgia. Nevertheless, the lack of living space served as a potential source of interethnic conflict. Several students said that confrontations over living space had already occurred at the Gldani facility, pitting Meskhetians against displaced ethnic Georgians. “At one point, some displaced persons from Abkhazia tried to take over our [language] instruction room and convert it into living space for a refugee family. They are jealous that we have this space, and this creates tension.”
To a certain extent, it appeared that inflated expectations could be a contributing factor in Meskhetian disappointment. Some returnees admitted that they arrived with somewhat romanticized notions of what life in the homeland would be like. Rosa Nuretdinova is among those disillusioned Meskhetians who have had difficulty in adjusting to reality. Born in Uzbekistan, Nuretdinova spent a prolonged period in Azerbaijan before arriving in Meskhetia in 1997. During her childhood, her mother, who was 12 years old at the time of deportation in 1944, would constantly reminisce, describing Meskhetia in idyllic terms. “My mother portrayed this place [Meskhetia] as if it was heaven. I would listen to her as if I was listening to a fairy tale,” Nuretdinova said. “Of course, when I got here I learned the difficult truth. All the gardens and orchards that we [Meskhetians] had cultivated [before 1944] were destroyed, and the land was not that rich.”
Official Commitments
There are mechanisms that in theory could facilitate the large-scale repatriation of Meskhetians to Georgia. In practice, however, the mechanisms largely are not being implemented.
There are two commitments pertaining to Meskhetians worthy of special attention. The first is a 1992 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) treaty on formerly deported peoples, known as the Bishkek agreement. The pact condemns the “past totalitarian practice of forced resettlement” and confirms the “right of deported persons, national minorities and peoples, to the restoration of historic justice and to return to places of their residence at the moment of deportation.” Articles in the pact guarantee the same political, economic, and social rights for returnees as enjoyed by citizens, and provides for easy naturalization procedures. They also offer tax and customs breaks to lessen the impact of repatriation. The treaty was signed by nine CIS states. But Georgia is not a signatory, as it was not a CIS member at the time, and has not joined the treaty since becoming a CIS member. Azerbaijan also is not a party to the agreement.
Starting in 1993, Georgia launched a number of small-scale initiatives to stimulate the return of Meskhetians under limited circumstances. A state agency was established in 1994 to handle repatriation, but its work has been hampered since its inception by a funding shortage. The government also pledged to establish a reception center for returning Meskhetians. But the most significant initiative came in the form of a December 1996 decree designed to resolve the repatriation dilemma. The decree, signed by President Eduard Shevardnadze, established a state commission to consider the Meskhetian issue. The commission, in turn, developed a return blueprint that called on Georgia to receive upwards of 5,000 Meskhetians by 2000. To facilitate repatriation, the blueprint called for the drafting of a law that would “rehabilitate” Meskhetians, paving the way for the expedited acquisition of citizenship. It also pledged to provide returning Meskhetians with job training and other forms of state aid, as well as committing the state to undertake a media information campaign to promote tolerance for returnees.
In the two years since its adoption, there has been little progress towards the realization of principles embodied in the presidential decree. There were no indications, for instance, that the Georgian parliament would approve a comprehensive rehabilitation law in the immediate future. The one rehabilitation initiative to date, approved in 1997, has floundered because of its narrow construction. Under the initiative, those eligible for rehabilitation must be Georgian citizens. Virtually no Meskhetians are Georgian citizens, thus they are excluded from coverage.
The Domestic Political and Economic Context
The reluctance of Georgian authorities to move ahead on Meskhetian repatriation is better understood when the issue is placed in the context of the overall political and economic conditions in the Transcaucasian nation.
The Soviet collapse ravaged Georgia’s economy, with the primary damage being done by two separatist struggles—in the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions. Those conflicts displaced more than 300,000 persons, mostly ethnic Georgians driven out of Abkhazia. (For an extensive analysis on Abkhazia consult the Forced Migration Projects’ special report Repatriation in Georgia). The displaced have an adverse impact on state finances, hindering the government’s ability to stimulate economic growth. According to Rusudan Beridze, a member of President Shevardnadze’s National Security Council, up to 10 percent of Georgia’s annual budget is spent on accommodating and supporting the displaced. Nevertheless, Georgia recorded strong economic growth in 1997 and the first half of 1998, while the annual inflation rate hovered around six percent. However, the lack of political settlements to the Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts ensures that the economic recovery will remain fragile, vulnerable to sudden shifts in the political climate.
Economic uncertainty was accompanied by debilitating internal political struggles. Since gaining independence in 1991, Georgia has weathered a civil war that left the center of the capital, Tbilisi, a smoldering ruin, and led to the ouster of the then president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia. Eduard Shevardnadze eventually replaced Gamsakhurdia, but political life has remained tumultuous under the leadership of the former Soviet foreign minister. President Shevardnadze has survived numerous assassination attempts. In mid-1998, a constitutional crisis gripped Georgia, in which the executive and legislative branches of government were competing for policy making influence. The political wrangling rendered consensus-building on contentious issues, such as Meskhetian repatriation, virtually impossible.
Geopolitical Considerations
Serving to further complicate Meskhetian repatriation prospects are Georgia’s geopolitical circumstances. The country has yet to break free from Russia’s hegemonic grip. Except for a brief period of independence shortly after the Bolshevik coup in 1917, Georgia was ruled by Moscow from its annexation in 1800 until the Soviet collapse in 1991. Since then, Russia has pressed to retain a controlling political interest not only in Georgia, but the entire Transcaucasus region. As the technical successor state to the Soviet Union, Russia maintains military bases and a 15,000-strong garrison in Georgia. Russian peacekeeping troops are also found in Abkhazia. In addition, under a 1994 bilateral treaty that was effectively imposed on Tbilisi, roughly 11,000 Russian border guards patrol Georgia’s border with Turkey—the same region that comprises the Meskhetians’ homeland. Georgian officials have accused Moscow of utilizing its peacekeepers in Abkhazia to unsettle, rather than stabilize, the situation in the breakaway region.
Russia’s influence in Georgian affairs additionally looms large in the ongoing struggle in the Transcaucasus for oil and transit routes. Large reserves of oil and gas, with the potential to dramatically improve local living standards, are being developed in neighboring Azerbaijan. Georgia would stand to benefit economically by serving as a transit nation, helping to bring Azerbaijani oil and gas to Western markets. This would be accomplished by the construction of a pipeline that links the Azerbaijani oil and gas fields with Turkish ports, where tankers would stand ready to deliver the oil and gas to Western consumers. Azerbaijan and Georgia had originally hoped to open the first part of the link in late 1998, but those plans have been delayed.
In order for the transit route to Turkey to be viable, Georgia requires social stability in areas along the pipeline route, including in the Meskhetia region. Georgian officials have openly accused Russia of trying to stir unrest in an effort to bully Georgia into acquiescing to Moscow’s wishes on the pipeline issue. Russia prefers that any pipeline go through its territory. Georgia’s Speaker of Parliament Zurab Zhvania in late June 1998 warned of a looming catastrophe, involving ethnic conflicts fomented by Russia’s “subversive” policies. Shevardnadze additionally accused Russia of fanning discontent among ethnic Armenians in Georgia living along the Turkish border. Such allegations reflected the high level of tension existing between Russia and Georgia.
Divided Opinion on RepatriationGeorgia’s precarious economy, combined with its turbulent domestic and foreign politics, makes the topic of Meskhetian repatriation a touchstone of controversy. Opinions were deeply divided among the decision makers in the political establishment. Generally, Shevardnadze’s presidential administration was more anxious to resolve the Meskhetian dilemma than were political leaders in the legislative branch. Still, no politician in Georgia has argued for immediate solutions. Any repatriation formula, various political leaders said, must be gradual so as to limit the possibilities of social disturbances. “The task is to resolve this question without harming our efforts to settle other conflicts,” Zhvania said.
Rusudan Beridze, one of Shevardnadze’s national security advisers, said it was imperative that Georgia confront the repatriation issue, no matter how potentially economically burdensome. Although Soviet authorities were responsible for the injustice done to Meskhetians, Georgia should feel an obligation to apologize, Beridze added. “We are the heirs of the former system that committed barbaric acts,” she said. Ignoring the issue could have negative consequences for Georgian state-building efforts, she cautioned. “If we do not do something [about Meskhetians], people will not take seriously the development of civil rights and democratic principles in this country.” An additional incentive for the Georgian president is the fact that realizing Georgia’s strategic aim of greater integration into Western European political structures depends in part on the Meskhetian dilemma. “If we want to join the Council of Europe, we must be ready to accept Western European standards,” Beridze said.
While Georgian parliamentary leaders acknowledged the need to address the Meskhetian issue, there is palpably less enthusiasm for action in the legislature than exists in the executive branch. A primary motive for inaction is fear, generated by Georgia’s recent history of interethnic strife. Many Georgians worry that taking steps towards the large-scale repatriation of Meskhetians would be tantamount to initiating another disastrous separatist struggle. “Parliamentary factions, along with the Georgian military, tend to see Meskhetian repatriation in geopolitical terms, in other words, a threat,” said Hy Shellow, a Tbilisi-based UNHCR protection officer. Repatriation skeptics worry that Meskhetians have a hidden agenda, in which returnees would seek to break away from Georgia and unite the Meskhetia region with Turkey. Calls by the Vatan movement for Meskhetian cultural autonomy merely enhance Georgian sensitivities about the preservation of the country’s territorial integrity. “We must say categorically that the teaching in schools in the Turkish language does not correspond to the state building blueprint of Georgia,” said Guram Mamulia, who heads Georgia’s Repatriation Service.
There existed in legislative circles a widely held feeling that Georgia was being forced to shoulder an unfair burden. Although Georgia is not culpable for the 1944 deportation of Meskhetians, Georgian legislators perceived that their country was being expected to cope alone with remedying the injustice. “It is a complex problem that involves not only Georgia, but also Russia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and others,” said Guram Sharadze, chairman of the parliament’s Committee on Migration. “When we speak about responsibility, who mentions Uzbekistan’s role in the 1989 riots?” Accordingly, many not just in the legislature, as well as in the executive branch, said other former Soviet states should help absorb the costs that would be involved with large-scale Meskhetian repatriation.
Prominent members of parliament also raised economic arguments against repatriation. They said that no matter how great the desire to settle the Meskhetian issue, Georgia lacked the resources to undertake substantive programs in 1998. They added that action could be taken only after durable solutions to the Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts were found. “We have more than 300,000 internally displaced persons and we cannot properly provide for them,” said Sharadze, one of the most vocal repatriation skeptics. “Only after they [IDPs] return can we begin to talk about Meskhetians.”
Given the level of skepticism among legislators, Shellow suggested that the formulation of a humane and secure repatriation framework would take time, and require the active participation of the international community. “The international community should help, not hurt,” Shellow said. “We should not pander to emotion.… Does it make sense to pick up these people [Meskhetians] and place them into an unstable situation? You can’t have any return to Georgia until the Georgian government is committed in law to providing these people with long-term status.”
Shellow stressed that a rehabilitation law must not be rushed. Implementation of repatriation legislation requires a full and lengthy public debate. “Care must be taken in the drafting of laws. They must make sure that parliament gives its full support,” Shellow said. “It might be simple for the president to issue a decree [on rehabilitation and repatriation], but to translate that into binding law you have to have the cooperation of parliament.”
Popular Mood
The views of legislators could be interpreted as a reflection of the popular mood. If anything, the general population as a whole was more skeptical about the utility of Meskhetian repatriation than were the country’s elected representatives. “Society as a whole is not prepared for the return of Meskhetians,” Mamulia said. Yet, while politicians worried most about a possible new separatist threat stirred by returning Meskhetians, average citizens tended to concern themselves more with the economic implications of repatriation. Many saw Meskhetians as potential competitors for scarce jobs and housing. Meskhetians’ Islamic beliefs also provoked suspicion in Georgia, a country deeply rooted in Christianity. In addition, there was concern, especially among those displaced by the conflicts in Abkhazia or South Ossetia, that a large-scale repatriation effort would reduce the state’s ability to provide welfare assistance for other forced migrants.
As could be expected, sensitivities were most acute in Meskhetia. The remoteness of many agricultural settlements in mountainous regions meant that farmers endured dire living conditions while existing amidst a dearth of outside information. Such isolation, acting in tandem with economic uncertainty, effectively served as an incubator for apprehension about change. The main fear was that returning Meskhetians would upset the tenuous economic balance. Some expressed additional concern that returning Meskhetians would press for either compensation or restitution of their confiscated lands, thus potentially displacing current residents.
Exacerbating suspicion was the fact that a significant number of Meskhetia’s residents are ethnic Armenians who were resettled in the region following the 1944 deportation. Armenians and Turks have been implacable enemies for most of the 20th century, and enmity has lately been fanned by the struggle over Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian-dominated enclave located in nearby Azerbaijan. Armenians in Meskhetia openly warned of trouble if Meskhetians were to return. “The Turks got what they deserved,” said Grigor Petrosyan, a farmer in the village of Khaki, referring to Meskhetians. “There could be conflicts. All their [Meskhetian] land has been redistributed and if they were to return they might try to get it back. We will not permit this.”
Some government representatives suggested that public opinion was perhaps the most significant obstacle to resolving the Meskhetian dilemma. “Social opinion is very divided,” Beridze said. “We should try to create consensus utilizing an information campaign on television and radio.”
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